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OPINION 
______________________ 
 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Baldwin and Santos Centeno appeal their convictions 
and sentences arising from violent assaults at the 
Independence National Historical Park in Philadelphia.1  Each 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions.  In addition, Baldwin argues that his conviction 
must be reversed due to a constructive amendment of the 
Indictment and, in any event, that his sentence must be 
vacated due to the District Court’s failure to personally 
address him before imposing its sentence.  Finally, each 
contends that one conviction violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause and must be vacated.  We conclude that the evidence 
is sufficient to support the convictions but, with respect to 
Baldwin, the Government’s rebuttal summation advocated a 
                                                                
 1 For convenience, we will refer to each defendant by 
his first name. 
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basis for conviction that was not charged in the Indictment 
and resulted in a constructive amendment, requiring that we 
vacate his convictions and remand for a new trial.  As to 
Santos, we agree with the parties that one of his assault 
convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause so we will 
vacate that single conviction and remand for resentencing.  
 
I 
 
The charges arise from incidents that occurred on June 
16 and 20, 2012.  Around 1:00 a.m. on June 16, 2012, Ashish 
Lokhande was found lying in a pool of blood on the sidewalk 
in Independence National Historical Park.  Lokhande could 
not recall being assaulted or ever seeing either Baldwin or 
Santos.  He remembered only having been to work that day 
and waking up in the hospital days later.  Lokhande testified 
that his “normal routine” for a Friday evening was to drive his 
car into Philadelphia to go salsa dancing and that he typically 
parked his car around Fifth and Market Streets, near 
Independence National Historical Park.   
 
 Christopher Robles was with Baldwin and Santos on 
the night of the assault.  Robles testified that he, Baldwin, and 
Santos drove from Santos’s apartment in Camden, New 
Jersey into Philadelphia, using Baldwin’s four-door sedan 
with a black hood that did not match the color of the rest of 
the car.  After they parked, Santos and Baldwin exited the car 
and Robles remained in the backseat.2   
 
                                                                
 2 Robles testified that he stayed in the car because he 
was too “drunk” to walk.  App. 446.   
5 
 
       Shortly thereafter, three men joined Baldwin and 
Santos.  Robles testified that Baldwin and Santos leaned 
against the car while the three men paced back and forth 
along the sidewalk.  The group talked, drank, and laughed.  
Eventually, a man approached Baldwin and Santos and asked 
if they could help him locate his car.3  Robles testified that he 
then saw the man “being attacked,” App. 431, which included 
being hit and punched.  
 
 Robles testified that Baldwin and Santos were 
“around” the victim, App. 432, 435, and were “in the group of 
five that attacked” him, App. 444.  Robles further admitted 
that “any” or “all” “of [the] five men” could have attacked the 
victim, that he did not see who struck him, App. 443-44, and 
that he could not say whether Baldwin or Santos were 
“looking or hitting,” App. 508-09. 
 
 After the attack, Baldwin, Santos, and the three other 
men yelled “let’s go” and quickly “ran” to Baldwin’s car.  
App. 448, 451, 455.  As they drove away, Robles saw the 
victim lying on the ground, bleeding.  Video surveillance tape 
from a nearby building showed a gold or tan Ford Taurus 
with a black hood leaving the scene of the assault at 
approximately 12:50 a.m. on June 16, 2012.  According to 
Robles, Baldwin drove the car back to Camden.  Cell tower 
records showed that Lokhande’s cell phone was in Camden 
hours later.   
 
                                                                
 3 About two hours before the assault, Lokhande’s car 
was towed from a parking spot near where Lokhande was 
found.   
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 Four days later, on June 20, 2012, Santos and Baldwin 
returned to Independence National Historical Park and 
encountered Joseph Crumbock and his wife, D.W.  Around 
10:15 p.m., Crumbock and D.W. were walking in the same 
location where Lokhande had been assaulted.  Crumbock and 
his wife saw “four guys standing around [a] car,” App. 515, 
“just staring [them] down,” App. 559.  After they walked 
approximately ten to fifteen feet past the men, Santos “came 
running at” Crumbock, App. 517, “calling [him] names,” and 
pushing and punching him.  App. 518.  Crumbock testified 
that the other three men came over and “surrounded” him and 
that “two of them jumped on [his] back” and “punched [him] 
in the face.”  App. 519-20.  Crumbock’s cell phone and wallet 
were stolen during the attack.   
 
 While on the ground, Crumbock saw Santos “standing 
over” D.W., who “was screaming on the ground.”  App. 520.  
Crumbock recalled that his wife’s face “was all bloody” and 
that she was “crying and screaming,” App. 521, as Santos 
attempted to “drag[] her across the sidewalk” using the strap 
on her pocketbook, App. 524-25.  D.W. testified that she fell 
to the ground after Santos punched her in the mouth.4   
 
 A U.S. Park Ranger heard D.W.’s screams, exited his 
station, and saw “a man dragging a woman . . . in the middle 
of [the] Street.”  App. 651.  He yelled “stop, police,” and ran 
after the man, App. 652, who “got into the rear passenger” 
                                                                
 4 Crumbock identified Santos both in a photo array and 
during trial as the man who attacked him and D.W.  Because 
of a suppression ruling, D.W. did not make an in-court 
identification, but the Government published to the jury the 
photo array indicating D.W. identified Santos as her attacker.   
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side of a gold or tan four-door 2003 Ford Taurus with a black 
hood later determined to be registered to the mother of 
Baldwin’s child, App. 652, 656, 710-11, 716-18.5  Two days 
later, law enforcement stopped the car in Camden with 
Baldwin, Santos, and Robles inside.   
 
 A grand jury returned a five-count Indictment against 
the Centenos.  For the June 16, 2012 incident, the Indictment 
charged the Centenos with: (1) knowingly assaulting, and 
aiding and abetting assault, “resulting in serious bodily 
injury” to Lokhande in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6), 2 
(Count One); (2) knowingly assaulting, and aiding and 
abetting assault, by “striking, beating or wounding” Lokhande 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(4), 2 (Count Two); and 
(3) knowingly taking, and aiding and abetting the taking of, 
property belonging to Lokhande by force and violence and 
intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2 (Count 
Three).  App. 30-32.  As to the June 20, 2012 incident, the 
                                                                
 5 Around this time, Chelsea Schmotzer was sitting in 
the driver’s seat of her parked car at an intersection near 
Independence National Historical Park.  Schmotzer testified 
that she saw a gold car pull up behind her and four men exit 
the car.  The men “split up” in different directions, App. 583-
84, and, approximately ten to twenty minutes later, Schmotzer 
heard a woman “screaming for help, clearly very distressed,” 
App. 584-85.  Schmotzer then saw the men “running towards 
[her] car” and one of the men, whom she identified as 
Baldwin, ran “right by” her side mirror.  App. 585-86.  
Schmotzer also testified that she made eye contact with 
Baldwin and that he resembled one of the men who exited the 
gold car minutes earlier.   
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Indictment charged the Centenos with: (1) knowingly 
assaulting, and aiding and abetting assault, “by striking, 
beating [or] wounding” Crumbock and D.W. in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(4), 2 (Count Four); and (2) taking, and 
aiding and abetting the taking of, property belonging to 
Crumbock and D.W. “by force and violence[, or] by 
intimidation” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2 (Count 
Five).  App. 33-34.   
 
 The Centenos proceeded to trial.  In his summation, 
Baldwin’s counsel argued that there was no evidence that 
Baldwin actually assaulted Lokhande, or that he was even 
“driving the car that night.”  App. 908.  His counsel also 
argued that “get[ting] in your car” and “leaving quickly” do 
not constitute aiding and abetting.  App. 913.  In its rebuttal 
summation, the Government told the jury: 
 
Defense counsel mentioned aiding and abetting, 
the Judge is going to instruct you on the law on 
this point.  You can still be guilty if you don’t 
throw a punch.  Not the first punch, second 
punch, it doesn’t matter if you never touch the 
guy, you can still be guilty as long as you’re 
supporting and participating in some way.  You 
cannot be part of a group that commits a crime 
and then say I didn’t touch him; not me.  That’s 
not how the law works.   
 
So . . . any one of these points I’m about to go 
over, you can find [Baldwin] guilty. . . .  [Y]ou 
can find him guilty because he was part of [the] 
group that knowingly, physically went around 
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Mr. Lokhande . . . if he’s around that group 
preventing a victim from escaping, that’s guilty.   
 
If he was part of a group – if his physical 
presence was supporting the other assailants, 
that is guilty.   
 
If he was a getaway driver, driving his car away 
from a crime scene after the victim fell to the 
ground and he knowingly is driving the car, that 
alone, he’s guilty, any one of these. 
 
App. 920.   
 
 Defense counsel immediately objected, contending 
that the Government’s comments amounted to an “accessory 
after the fact” theory that had not been charged in the 
Indictment.  App. 923.  The District Court overruled the 
objection, but informed defense counsel: “[I]f you want a 
specific curative instruction I will be happy to do that if you 
propose language.”  App. 924.  Defense counsel suggested: “I 
just figure the jury should know that unless there’s evidence 
that the car was used in the assault, like he drove it into the 
victim or something like that, there’s – getting in the car and 
leaving the scene is . . . [in]sufficient to show aiding and 
abetting, robbery, and assault.”  App. 929.  The District Court 
rejected defense counsel’s suggested instruction, stating “I 
think the model jury instruction that I’m giving as 
supplemented with your request, adequately addresses both 
side’s concern.”  App. 929.  It instructed the jurors as follows 
with respect to aiding and abetting: 
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In order to find a defendant guilty of an offense 
because he aided and abetted the principal in 
committing that offense, you must find that the 
[G]overnment proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt each of the following four elements: One, 
that [t]he principal committed the offense 
charged by committing each of the elements of 
the offenses charged, as I have explained those 
elements to you in my instructions.  The 
principal need not have been charged with, or 
found guilty of, the offense, however, as long as 
you find that the [G]overnment proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he committed the 
offense.  Second, that the defendant knew that 
the offense charged was going to be committed 
or was being committed by the principal.  Third, 
that the defendant knowingly did some act for 
the purpose of aiding, assisting, soliciting, 
facilitating, or encouraging the principal in 
committing the specific offense charged and 
with the intent that the principal commit that 
specific offense.  And fourth, that the 
defendants did in some way aid, assist, 
facilitate, or encourage the principal to commit 
the offense.  The defendant’s acts need not 
themselves be against the law.  
 
. . . [E]vidence that the defendant merely 
associated with persons involved in a criminal 
venture, or was merely present, or was merely a 
knowing spectator during the commission of the 
offense is not enough for you to find him guilty 
as an aider and abettor.  An individual has no 
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legal obligation or duty to report a crime he 
witnesses. 
 
. . . The [G]overnment must prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant in some 
way participated in the offense committed by 
the principal as something that the defendant 
wished to bring about and to make succeed.  
 
App. 962-64. 
 
 Before excusing the jurors for deliberation, the District 
Court provided the following limiting instruction concerning 
the similarities between the June 16 and June 20, 2012 
incidents:  
 
Now, you have heard testimony that the 
defendants participated in assaults and robberies 
on June 16th and June 20th.  In determining 
whether a defendant committed the offense 
charged on one of the nights in question, you 
may consider evidence regarding the events on 
the other night in question for the limited 
purpose of deciding whether a defendant: (1) 
acted with a method of operation as evidenced 
by a unique pattern or did not commit the acts 
for which he is on trial by accident or mistake 
or is the person who committed the crime 
charged in the indictment.  Of course, it is for 
you to determine whether you believe this 
evidence, and if you believe it, whether you 
accept it for those purposes I have just 
mentioned.  You may give it such weight as you 
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feel it deserves to receive, but only for the 
limited purpose that I described to you.   
 
For example, you may not conclude that simply 
because a defendant committed certain acts on 
June 16th, he must also have committed certain 
acts on June 20th and vice versa.  You must still 
determine whether there is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendants committed 
each charged offense on June 16th and each 
charged offense on June 20th.  Similarly, you 
may not consider evidence of acts committed on 
one night as evidence of a defendant’s bad 
character or propensity to commit the crimes 
charged on the other night. . . . 
 
App. 951-52.6  
 
 Baldwin was convicted of the two assault charges 
related to the June 16, 2012 incident but was acquitted of the 
robbery charge related to the June 16, 2012 incident and all 
charges related to the June 20, 2012 incident.  Santos was 
convicted of all assault charges and the June 20, 2012 robbery 
but was acquitted of the June 16, 2012 robbery.   
 
 During Baldwin’s sentencing hearing, the District 
Court asked Baldwin’s counsel: “Does your client wish to 
speak to the court?”  App. 1102-03.  Baldwin’s counsel 
answered “No,” and the District Court responded, “He has a 
right to speak to the court.  He doesn’t want to speak to the 
court?”  App. 1103.  Baldwin’s counsel answered, “Not at 
                                                                
 6 The parties consented to this limiting instruction.   
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this time, Your Honor.”  Id.  The District Court did not 
directly address Baldwin.  Baldwin received a sentence of 
fifty-seven months’ imprisonment.  Santos received a 
sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment.  Both appeal their 
convictions and sentences. 
 
II7 
 
A 
 
 The Centenos challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting their convictions.  In reviewing this claim, we ask 
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).  This is a 
“particularly deferential standard of review.”  United States v. 
Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).  “We do not weigh 
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. . . .”  
United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, we view the 
evidence as a whole and “ask whether it is strong enough for 
a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “a reviewing court faced 
with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting 
inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively 
                                                                
 7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742. 
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appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such 
conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that 
resolution.”  McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133 (2010) 
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 We will first review the elements of the offenses and 
then examine the record to see if there is evidence from which 
a rational juror could find that the elements were proven.  
Each defendant was convicted of assault in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6) and (a)(4), and 2.  To prove assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of § 113(a)(6), 
the Government must prove: (1) the defendant assaulted 
another person; (2) the assault caused the other person to 
suffer serious bodily injury; and (3) the assault took place 
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.8  18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6).  To prove assault “by 
striking, beating, or wounding” in violation of § 113(a)(4), 
the Government must prove that, while within the special 
                                                                
 8 Two appellate courts have indicated that a violation 
of § 113(a)(6) also requires proof that the assault occurred by 
“intentionally striking” the victim.  United States v. Davis, 
726 F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Felix, 996 
F.2d 203, 207 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the difference 
between what is now designated as § 113(a)(4) and (a)(6) is 
the degree of injury that results from the assault, suggesting 
striking is an element of both offenses).  But see, e.g., United 
States v. Bruce, 458 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(stating that assault resulting in serious bodily injury does not 
require proof of physical touching).  We need not resolve 
whether striking is an element because the jury was instructed 
that it was and the evidence shows that Lokhande, Crumbock, 
and D.W. were struck.  
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maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the 
defendant assaulted the victim while making “some form of 
physical contact.”  United States v. Herron, 539 F.3d 881, 886 
(8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Bruce, 458 F.3d 
1157, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that assault by 
striking requires physical touching).   
 
 With respect to “aiding and abetting” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2, the Government must prove: “(1) that another committed 
a substantive offense; and (2) the one charged with aiding and 
abetting knew of the commission of the substantive offense 
and acted to facilitate it.”  United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 
841, 846 (3d Cir. 2010).  Additionally, we require proof that 
the defendant had the specific intent to facilitate the crime.  
Id.  “One can aid or abet another through use of words or 
actions to promote the success of the illegal venture.”  Id.  
Indeed, “only some affirmative participation which at least 
encourages the principal offender to commit the offense” is 
required.  United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 
1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There must, 
however, be “more than associat[ion] with individuals 
involved in the criminal venture.”  United States v. Soto, 539 
F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “Neither mere presence at the scene of the crime 
nor mere knowledge of the crime is sufficient to support a 
conviction.”  Mercado, 610 F.3d at 846.  A defendant is not 
guilty of aiding and abetting an offense unless the defendant 
“did something to forward the crime and . . . was a participant 
rather than merely a knowing spectator.”  United States v. 
Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (parentheses and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rosemond v. 
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014) (“To aid and abet 
a crime, a defendant must not just in some sort associate 
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himself with the venture, but also participate in it as in 
something that he wishes to bring about and seek by his 
action to make it succeed.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).      
 
 Turning to the events of June 16, there is no dispute 
that Lokhande was assaulted by striking on property within 
the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States and that 
he sustained serious injuries.  The only issue is whether there 
was sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could find 
that the Centenos aided and abetted the assault.  We conclude 
that, when the Centenos’ actions before, during and after the 
assault are viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Government, the evidence is sufficient to sustain their 
convictions.     
 
  Robles testified that the Centenos drove to 
Philadelphia, exited the car, and were met by three other men 
with whom they were friendly.  While they socialized, 
Lokhande approached the Centenos and asked them for help 
locating his car, after which Lokhande was immediately 
attacked.  This suggests that the Centenos were closer to 
Lokhande than the other men when the attack began.  Robles 
did not say who punched Lokhande nor did he say that the 
Centenos helped the victim.  Rather, he testified that Baldwin 
and Santos were “around” Lokhande during the attack, App. 
432, and they were “part of” the five-man group that attacked 
him.  App. 448.  From this, a rational juror could infer at a 
minimum that their physical presence was intimidating, 
prohibited the victim’s escape, or encouraged their friends to 
proceed in the assault and thus they were involved in the 
attack.  Cf. United States v. Barber, 429 F.2d 1394, 1396–97 
(3d Cir. 1970) (reversing defendant’s aiding-and-abetting-
17 
 
assault conviction where evidence suggested only that 
defendant was part of the 15-man group that confronted the 
FBI agents “before the outbreak of violence” and did not 
indicate whether defendant was acquainted with the other 
group members beforehand).   
 
 The Centenos’ conduct following the attack further 
supports a reasonable inference that they were participants.  
The Centenos fled the scene in the same car with the other 
three men immediately after the attack, and there is no 
evidence that they objected to the other three men leaving 
with them in Baldwin’s car.  Such flight with the other actors 
could reasonably be viewed as evidence of both approval of 
the conduct and consciousness of guilt.  United States v. 
Green, 25 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1994); Barber, 429 F.2d at 
1397 n.4 (observing that “[f]light from the scene of the crime 
with the actual perpetrators has been said to justify” an 
inference of “participation in the wrongdoing”).  Cell phone 
records also showed that Lokhande’s cell phone was near the 
Centenos’ home in Camden hours after the attack, a fact a 
rational juror might find evinces the Centenos’ participation 
in the assault.   
 
 Lastly, four days later, the Centenos traveled together 
in the same car to approximately the same location, where 
Santos assaulted and robbed Crumbock and D.W., and 
Baldwin was observed fleeing from the area of the assault.  
From this evidence, a rational juror could find that the 
Centenos “acted with a method of operation as evidenced by 
a unique pattern” App. 952, and that it was less likely the 
Centenos were “merely . . . knowing spectator[s]” on June 
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16.9  Dixon, 658 F.2d at 189 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 Taken together under our “highly deferential” standard 
of review, Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430, these facts 
provide a basis for a rational juror to conclude that the 
Centenos were involved in the attack.  See generally 
Mercado, 610 F.3d at 846 (reiterating that “[a]n aiding and 
abetting conviction can be supported solely with 
circumstantial evidence as long as there is a logical and 
convincing connection between the facts established and the 
conclusion inferred” (internal quotation marks omitted)).    
Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support their 
convictions on Counts One and Two.               
 
 We next examine the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting Santos’s convictions arising from the June 20, 
2012 assault by striking (Count Four) and robbery (Count 
Five).  Again, there is no dispute that an assault and robbery 
occurred within the special territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.  The only issue is whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Santos played a 
                                                                
 9 Baldwin “affirmatively challenges the Rule 404(b)” 
ruling only should the Court “view the June 20 evidence as 
integral to any conclusion that the evidence was sufficient as 
to” June 16, see Baldwin Br. 33 & 34 n.13, but neither he nor 
Santos raises a Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) violation as among the 
issues in this appeal, see id. at 3; Santos Br. 3.  Because these 
issues were “not squarely argued” and were at most “raised in 
passing (such as, in a footnote),” they are waived.  See John 
Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. Cigna Int’l Corp., 119 F. 3d 1070, 
1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997).     
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role in these events.  We conclude the evidence is sufficient.  
Crumbock and D.W. described the June 20 events in detail 
and identified Santos as their attacker either on the witness 
stand, in a photo array, or both.  D.W. specifically testified 
that Santos punched her, and Crumbock testified that Santos 
punched him and “dragg[ed] [D.W.] across the sidewalk” 
using the strap of her pocketbook.  App. 524.  A U.S. Park 
Ranger saw the man who dragged D.W. into the middle of the 
street, enter the rear passenger side of a car later shown to be 
registered to the mother of Baldwin’s child.  Crumbock 
described the getaway car as an older model four-door car 
with a roof of a different color than the rest of the car, a 
description largely consistent with the gold four-door 2003 
Ford Taurus with a black hood in which the Centenos were 
found two days later.  Thus, the evidence against Santos, 
viewed as a whole in the light most favorable to the 
Government, was “strong enough for a rational trier of fact to 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d at 430 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Crumbock also testified that his wallet and cell phone 
were stolen.  Santos makes no specific argument as to his 
robbery conviction.  He pins his entire sufficiency challenge 
on D.W.’s apparently erroneous description of her assailant as 
having a lazy eye, and on Crumbock’s description of the 
getaway car as “maybe like a Lincoln, I’m not sure” and his 
statement that he “believe[d]” it was the car’s roof that had a 
different color than the rest of the car (as opposed to the 
hood).  App. 526.  The jury’s verdict demonstrates that it did 
not find these minor differences consequential, which is 
wholly rational in light of Crumbock and D.W.’s 
identification of Santos as the assailant, the U.S. Park 
Ranger’s corroborative testimony about the man he saw 
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“drag[] a woman” in the street, App. 651, and escape in a car 
registered to the mother of Baldwin’s child, Schmotzer’s 
testimony that she heard a woman scream and saw Baldwin 
running in the street after having seen several men get out of 
a gold car ten to twenty minutes earlier, and the fact that the 
Centenos and Robles were found in the same car two days 
after the assault.  For these reasons, the evidence is sufficient 
to sustain Santos’s convictions on Counts Four and Five and 
we will affirm his conviction on these counts.   
   
B 
 
 We next address Baldwin’s constructive amendment 
argument.  Although the evidence is sufficient to support 
Baldwin’s convictions on Counts One and Two for the June 
16 assault, we cannot be sure that the jury did not rely on an 
uncharged theory of liability for its verdict.  The Government 
told the jury that it could convict Baldwin of aiding and 
abetting the June 16 assault based solely on his role as the 
driver of the getaway car.  Baldwin asserts that this amounted 
to a constructive amendment of the Indictment because it 
permitted the jury to convict him of aiding and abetting based 
on facts that would support a conviction for the offense of 
accessory after the fact, which was not charged.10  We agree.   
                                                                
 10 Baldwin preserved his objection and thus we review 
for harmless error.  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 
(1999).  We note, however, that because “[a] constructive 
amendment of the charges against a defendant deprives the 
defendant of his/her substantial right to be tried only on 
charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury,” 
United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), constructive 
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 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall 
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  “Because of this constitutional guarantee, a 
court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are 
not made in the indictment against him.”  United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “From this rule comes 
the general prohibition against constructive amendments.”  Id.  
A constructive amendment occurs when, 
 
in the absence of a formal amendment, the 
evidence and jury instructions at trial modify 
essential terms of the charged offense in such a 
way that there is a substantial likelihood that the 
jury may have convicted the defendant for an 
offense differing from the offense the 
indictment returned by the grand jury actually 
charged.    
 
United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Put differently, “[a]n indictment is constructively amended 
when evidence, arguments, or the district court’s jury 
instructions effectively amends the indictment by broadening 
the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in 
the indictment.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 
                                                                                                                                               
amendments “are per se reversible under harmless error 
review,” United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 
2002).  In addition, because a constructive amendment claim 
presents a question of law, we exercise plenary review.  
United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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(3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and 
citation omitted). 
 
 To determine whether the Government constructively 
amended the Indictment here, we consider whether: (1) 
through its summation, the Government effectively 
“modif[ied] essential terms of” the aiding and abetting assault 
charges against Baldwin, Daraio, 445 F.3d at 259; and (2) in 
so doing, “broaden[ed] the possible bases for conviction from 
that which appeared in the [I]ndictment,” McKee, 506 F.3d at 
229 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 In its rebuttal summation, the Government noted that 
defense counsel had “mentioned aiding and abetting” with 
respect to Baldwin.  App. 920.  It then told the jury with 
respect to the assault charge: 
 
If he was a getaway driver, driving his car away 
from a crime scene after the victim fell to the 
ground and he knowingly is driving the car, that 
alone, he’s guilty, any one of these. 
 
App. 920.  In telling the jury that one can aid and abet an 
assault after the blows were struck, the Government 
effectively “modif[ied] essential terms of the” charges against 
Baldwin.  Daraio, 445 F.3d at 259.  This is because the 
assault offense was completed by the time Baldwin entered 
the car.   
 
 An offense is completed “when each element of the 
offense has occurred.”  United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 
873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999).  At least as the jury was instructed 
here, assault requires proof of an “intentionally striking” of 
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the victim, App. 957-59; see also United States v. Davis, 726 
F.3d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 2013), or making “some form of 
physical contact” with the victim, Herron, 539 F.3d at 886.  
An assault continues for as long as the striking occurs, but 
once the contact is done, the crime is complete.  Since aiding 
and abetting requires a deed that facilitates the completion of 
a crime, any such acts must logically occur before the crime 
is completed.  Indeed, “where the defendant merely 
provide[s] assistance to the perpetrator of the actual crime 
after its completion—and nothing more—a conviction for 
aiding and abetting the principal regarding that crime cannot 
stand.”  United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 
F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[A] person cannot be found 
guilty of aiding and abetting a crime that already has been 
committed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 
 Here, the Government argued to the jury that it could 
find Baldwin guilty of aiding and abetting the assault of 
Lokhande based solely on his role as the “getaway driver, 
driving his car away from a crime scene.”  App. 920.  By the 
time Baldwin and Santos drove away, however, Lokhande 
had already been physically attacked and the assault had been 
completed.  The Government’s assertion that the jury could 
find Baldwin guilty of aiding and abetting based only on 
helping Santos and the others flee the scene of the crime was 
therefore incorrect.  Indeed, as Baldwin points out, such 
conduct is consistent with the separate crime of being an 
accessory after the fact, a crime that was not charged.  See 
United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 637-40 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (holding that flight from the scene of an assault along 
with the principal does not alone constitute aiding and 
abetting but may be “strong evidence” of being an accessory 
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after the fact); see also Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d at 73-74 
(stating that aiding and abetting and being an accessory after 
the fact are “separate offense[s] with separate elements and [] 
separate punishment[s]”); 18 U.S.C. § 3 (defining the crime 
of being an accessory after the fact to include assisting an 
offender, “knowing that an offense . . . has been committed”).  
Thus, insofar as the Government’s rebuttal summation 
suggested to the jury that it could find Baldwin guilty of 
aiding and abetting for conduct that amounts to being an 
accessory after the fact, it “modif[ied] essential terms of” the 
Indictment by suggesting that the jury could convict Baldwin 
for an uncharged crime.  Daraio, 445 F.3d at 259.  Baldwin 
was not indicted for being an accessory after the fact, and 
“there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have 
convicted [Baldwin] for an offense differing from the offense 
the [I]ndictment returned by the grand jury actually charged.”  
Id. at 260.  The Government’s rebuttal summation 
“broaden[ed] the possible bases for conviction from that 
which appeared in the [I]ndictment” and thereby 
constructively amended it.  McKee, 506 F.3d at 229.   
 
 Not every stray remark in an argument or misstatement 
in an instruction necessarily results in a constructive 
amendment.  Indeed, such remarks may be cured with 
limiting or corrected instructions.  See United States v. 
Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2007) (declining to 
conclude that the Government had constructively amended 
the indictment when, during rebuttal, it suggested that the jury 
could determine the size of the charged conspiracy, in part 
because the district court instructed the jury in a manner 
consistent with the indictment, which charged a conspiracy of 
a specific size).  Here, the “jury instructions as a whole” did 
not make clear that finding that Baldwin had acted as the 
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getaway driver alone was insufficient to prove that he had 
aided and abetted the assault.  Daraio, 445 F.3d at 260-61 
(considering whether, notwithstanding the possibility that the 
evidence presented by the Government had constructively 
amended the indictment, the jury instructions “[o]verall .  .  .  
properly focused the jury” on the defendant’s “conduct as 
charged in the indictment”).  Because the instructions did not 
“ensure[] that the jury would convict [Baldwin], if at all, for a 
crime based on conduct charged in the [I]ndictment,” id. at 
260, we must vacate Baldwin’s convictions on Counts One 
and Two and remand for a new trial on those counts.11  See 
United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 156 (3d Cir. 2002).  
 
C 
 
 Finally, we consider Santos’s challenge to his 
conviction and sentence on Count Two, assault by striking in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4), based upon the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  Santos asserts that his conviction and 
sentence on this count violates the Double Jeopardy Clause 
because assault by striking is a lesser-included offense of 
                                                                
 11 Because we are ordering a new trial, we need not 
address Baldwin’s arguments about his sentence.  We do, 
however, remind the District Court of its obligation to address 
every defendant personally and invite him or her to address 
the Court before imposing sentence.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(i)(4)(A)(ii).  Asking counsel if his or her client would like 
to speak at sentencing does not satisfy Rule 32’s mandate that 
a sentencing judge directly address the defendant.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Count One, assault resulting in serious bodily injury in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6).12   
 
 Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, courts may not 
impose “greater punishment than the legislature intended to 
impose for a single offense.”  United States v. Miller, 527 
F.3d 54, 70 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“For the purpose of double jeopardy analysis, two offenses 
are the same if one is a lesser-included offense of the other 
under the ‘same-elements’ (or Blockburger) test.”  Id. at 71; 
see generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932).  The key inquiry under the “same-elements” or 
“Blockburger” test is “whether each offense contains an 
element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same 
offen[s]e.”  Miller, 527 F.3d at 71 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 The Government concedes error on this issue because 
of the way the jury instructions were phrased. With respect to 
assault by striking, the jury instructions required a finding of 
“intentionally striking, beating, or wounding,” and with 
respect to assault resulting in serious bodily injury, the jury 
instructions required a finding of “intentionally striking or 
wounding” resulting in serious bodily injury.  App. 957-59.  
Thus, under these instructions, the only difference between 
the two offenses is that one required proof of serious bodily 
injury and the other did not, making the latter a lesser 
included offense.  Thus, we will vacate Santos’s sentence on 
                                                                
 12 Santos concedes that he did not preserve this issue 
for appeal and that it is subject to plain error review.  United 
States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 70 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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Count Two and remand so the District Court can merge the 
two convictions on Counts One and Two and resentence him.  
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 543 (3d Cir. 2009).  
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will: (1) affirm Santos’s 
convictions on Counts One, Four, and Five, and vacate and 
remand for resentencing as to Counts One and Two; and (2) 
vacate Baldwin’s convictions on Counts One and Two and 
remand for a new trial.    
